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Article 8

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Due .process-Provision for
service on state officer-Necessity of notice to defendant. This
case involves the validity under the 14th Amendment 6f a statute of New -Jersey providing for service of process on nonresident of the .state in suits for injury by the negligent operation
of automobiles on its highways. (7 U. S. Sup. Court 313) Wluchter
v. Pizzutti. Pizzutti was driving a team of horses attached to a
wagon on the public highways of New Jersey. Wuchter was a
resident of Pennsylvania and was following the wagon with his
automobile. Wuchter drove his car so as to crash into the rear
of the wagon damaging it and injuring Pizzutti and his horses.
He instituted a suit against Wuchter in the Supreme Court of
New Jersey. The defendant was served with process under the
provisions of the statute, by leaving process with the Secretary
of State. A judgment interlocutory was taken against him and
a writ of inquiry of damages was issued. Although the statute
did not require it, notice of its proposed execution was actually
served personally on Wuchter in Pennsylvania. Wuchter did
not appear and a final judgment was entered. Wuchter then
appealed to the Supreme court contending that the act under
which process was served was unconstitutional, because it deprived him of property without due process of law, in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The statute in question made no provision for actual notice being communicated to the non-resident defendant.
Chief Justice Taft, in delivering the opinion of the court,
gives to us a very instructive conception of proper service under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The question made in the present case is whether a statute making the
Secretary of State the person to receive the process, must, in
order to be valid, contain a provision making it reasonably certain that notice of the service on the Secretary will be communicated to the non-resident defendant who is sued. We think that
a law with the effect of this one should make a reasonable provision for such probable communication. We quite agree, and,
indeed, have so held in the Pawloski. Case (274 U. S. 160, 61 L.
ed. 222J, that the act of a non-resident in using the highways of
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another state may be properly declared to be an agreement to
accept service of summons in a suit growing out of the use of
the highway by the owner of the automobile, but the enforced
acceptance of the service of process on a state officer by the defendant would not be fair or due process unless such officer or
the plaintiff is required to mail the notice to the defendant, or to
advise him, by some written communication, so as to make it
reasonably probable that he will receive actual notice. Otherwise, where the service of summons is limited to a service of the
Secretary of State or some officer of the State, without more, it
will be entirely possible for a person injured to sue any nonresident he chooses, and through service upon the state official
obtain a default judgment against a non-resident who has never
been in the state, who had nothing to do with the accident, or
whose automobile having been in the state has never injured
anybody. A provision of law for service that leaves open such
a clear opportunity for fraud (Heinentan sr. Per, 110 Wis. 185, 85
N. W. 646), or injustice is not a reasonable proyision, and in the
case supposed would certainly be depriving a defendant of his
property without due process of law.
In determining the reasonableness of provision: for service
we should consider the situation of both parties. The person
injured must find out to whom the offending automobile belongs. This may be a difficult task but should not be so difficult
when the operator is within the state. In finding out who it was,
and whether the person is of such financial responsibility as to
warrant a suit, he almost necessarily will secure knowledge of
his post office address or his place of residence, and thereby be
enabled to point out how notice may bie communicated to him.
With this information at hand the state may properly authorize
service to be made on one of its officials, if it also requires that
notice of that service shall be communicated to the person sued.
Every service of this kind therefore, should require the plaintiff
bringing the suit to show in the summons to be served the post
office address or residence of the defendant being sued, and
should impose either on the plaintiff himself or upon the official
receiving service or some other, the duty of communicating by
mail or otherwise with the defendantAn attempt was made by the counsel for the plaintiff in
argument to justify such service upon a non-resident motorist

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

by comparing the present statute with statutes which have been
upheld providing that non-resident corporations may properly
be served by leaving a summons with a state official,.where the
corporation has not indicated a resident agent to be served, (Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Cov. Gold Issue Min. & Mull. Co. 234 U. S. "93,
and Simon v. Southern R. Co. 236 U. S. 115). Such corporations
may be properly required to accept service through a public
officer as a condition of their doing business in the state. Their
knowledge of the statutory requirement may perhaps prompt
frequent inquiry as to suits against them, of their appointed
agent or at the office of. the public official to be served, but it
could hardly be fair or reasonable to require a non-resident individual owner of a motor vehicle who may use the state highways to make constant inquiry of the Secretary of State to learn
whether he has been sued. It has been held that even in cases
of non-resident corporations, that a statute directing service
upon them by leaving process with the state official is void if it
contains no provision requiring the officiil to give the foreign
corporations notice that suit has been brought and citation
served. (184 Fed. 959, 961 and in Gounerv. Missouri Valley Bridge
Co. 49 So. 657). In the latter case the Louisiana court said in respect to such a law ;--"This law makes no provision whatever
for the service on the defendant. The officer nay decline to
communicate with the person sued and give no notice whatever;
not even by mail. A judgment might be obtained without the
least knowledge of the person sued. Under the statute, the duty
of the officer begins and ends in his office. If such a judgment
were rendered, it could receive no recognition whatever at the
place of the domicile. When a petition can not legally be served
on a defendant, the court can exercise no jurisdiction over him.
The service defines the court's jurisdiction." A number of State
authorities are cited in the opinion none of which have gone ;o
far as to render valid a statute which does not make communication of actual notice to the defendant an essential element. (Nelson
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 225 Ill. 197, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1186,
Pinney-v. ProvidenceLoan Co. 80 Am. St. Rep. 41, 50 L. R. A. 577,
and Hinke v. Kettle River Co. 72 N. W. 835). The case of McDonald v. Mabee 243 U. S. 90, 61 L. ed. 608, 609, is also cited. In that
case a person domiciled in Texas left the state to make his home
in another state. An action for money was begun by publication
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in a newspaper after his departure, and a judgment recovered
and sustained by the state supreme court and later held to be
void by this court. In that case the supreme court pointed out
that the foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, although
in civilized times it is not necessary to maintain that power
throughout proceedings properly begun, and although submission to the jurisdiction by appearance may take the place of
service upon the person. No doubt there may be some extension of the means of acquiring jurisdiction beyond service or
appearance, but the foundation should be borne in mind. Subject to its conception of sovereignty even the common law required a judgment not to be contrary to natural justice ....

And

in states bound together by a constitution and 'subject to the
14th Amendment, great caution should be used not to let fiction
deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact. See Roler v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 44 L. Ed. 520,
20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410.
These cases and others indicate a general trend of authority
toward sustaining the validity of service of process, if the statutory provisions in themselves indicate that there is reasonable
probability that if the statutes are compiled with the defendant
will receive actual notice, and that is the principle which should
apply.
It i*s urged.in the present case that the defendant here had
actual notice by service out of New Jersey in Pennsylvania. He
did not, however, appear in the cause and such notice was not
required by the statute. Not having been directed by the statute it cannot therefore supply constitutional validity to the
statute or to service under it. (Coe vi. Armour Fertilizer Works,
237 U. S. 413, 59 L. ed. 1027 & fol., Louiszille & N. R. Co. v.
Central Stock Yards Co. 212 U. S. 132, 144, 53 L. ed. 441, 446;
Stuart v. Palmer 74 N. Y. 183, 188, 30 Am. Rep. 289; Berryhill v.
Sepp 106 Minn. 458, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 344.
It may be well to note that Justice Brandeis and Holmes
dissented from the main opinion delivered by the court upon the
ground that counsel for the defendant failed to raise the objection that such service was invalid in the lower court, and hence
it could not now be reviewed here. They did however object to
the jurisdiction of the court below and it seems reasonable that
their basis for such objection was that valid process had not been
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served. Such a technical objection should not be allowed to
stand in the path of justice in determining whether or not a person had been properly served.
-Edward P. McGuire.
CITIZENS-;-Child born of Chinese parents on American
vessel on high seas-Aliens. All sections of the country agree
that there is one great national problem which should concern
us more than all others, but as to what that great problem is,
each section will have a different answer. The middle west
unanimously points to the farm situation as the thing most in
need of attention, while down in Dixie the everpresent and most
important item of concern is the negro question. The western
coast, however, has its peculiar, problem in dealing with immigration from China, as is amply evidenced by the large number
of decisions of the federal courts involving questions of citizenship and immigration in that circuit. One of the latest of these
is the case of Lam Mo'w v. Nagle, Commissioner of Imngration,
24 Fed. (2d) 316. In that case, Lam Mow, alias Lam Korea, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus directed to John D. Nagle, as
commissioner of immigration for the port of San Francisco. His
petition was dismissed by the federal district court and he appealed.
Lam Mow was born of Chinese parents aboard an American
merchant vessel on the high seas. His parents at that time were
subjects of China but were domiciled in the United States and
were returning to' this country from China. Petitioner maintained that such conditions of birth made him a citizen of the
United States under Article 14, Section 1, of the federal constitution. That section in part provides that "all persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States." Petitioner based his
contention upon the assunmption that a merchant ship is to be
considered a part of the territory of the country in which she is
registered and under whose flag she sails. Color and human interest is added to this contention by the plea that any other decision would have the effect of making him virtually a man
without a country, and therefore without political status. "The
court, however, pointed out that the parents of petitioner at the
time of his birth were subjects of China and under the jurisdic-
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temporarily to such extent as is recognized by the law of nations
while a subject of one country is being transported on the high
.seas aboard a vessel of another sovereign. Petitioner, therefore,
did not owe allegiance to the United State merely because he
was born upon a ship sailing under the Stars and Stripes. In the
language of the court, "The general statement, or its equivalent,
that a vessel upon the high seas is deemed to be a part of the
territory of the nation whose flag she flies, must be understood
-as having a qualified or figurative meaning." Lam Mow, therefore, was not born "in the United States" within the meaning of
Article 14, Section 1, of the federal constitution, and the Circuit
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed the decision of the
district court.
-Henry Hasley.
CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide--Respondeat Superior. The
defendant was travelling in an automobile over a public highway in
Georgia. The car was driven by the defendant's chauffeur at a
rate of fifty miles an hour and as the car approached a curve it
,collided with another car, being driven in the opposite direction
:and the collision caused the death of an occupant in the latter
car.__The chauffeur stated after the accident that while in the
act of wiping the windshield he lost control of the car. The
chauffeur and the defendant were indicted for murder and the
former absconded and has not been apprehended. From the
evidence it did not appear that the defendant was at any time
-driving the car, nor did he give the chauffeur any directions as
to the manner .of operating the same. The jury found the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter and the question
was certified as to the validity of the verdict as a matter of law
by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Moreland v. State, (139 S.
E. 77).
It is generally recognized that the doctrine of respondeat
superior pertains only to civil cases and the application of the
-doctrine now being inaugurated in criminal law is apparently a
-deviation from recognized principles. Imputing the undirected
criminal acts of an agent to his principal in the prosecution of
-such a serious felony as homicide is a dangerous departure unless substantiated by competent authority. The court cites only
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one case (Commonwealth v. Sherman, 191 Mass. 349 ) which it
considers the exact question to have been decided. In the
Massachussetts case the defendant's cliauffeur exceed the speed.
limit of twelve miles an hour and the court found the defendant
guilty of Apeeding although he was not operating the automobile. It seems almost absurd that any court of last resort should
innovate a precedent of such auspicious gravity as finding a man
guilty of homicide based on the reasoning of a court which
passed on such an insignificant misdemeanor as "exceeding the
speed limits of twelve miles an hour".
There are cases holding corporations guilty. of crimes on the
theory that a corporation commits the crime itself when its negligent agents act intra vires. This rule has been enunciated in
the Federal Courts (159 Federal 582).
In the instant case granting that the theory advanced is
correct as a matter of law that the defendant is held liable for
homicide on the theory of respondeat superior and that the negligence of the agent was imputed to him either by a failure to
restrain the agent from speeding or by impliedly ratifying the
act, where will the Supreme Court of Georgia terminate the application of the rule? Will all the acts of chauffeurs while the
oq.ner is in the car be imputed to him by the application of respondeat superior? If the doctrine is applied in criminal cases,
it is not preposterous to foresee fathers convicted for murder in
many states which hold the latter responsible for the torts of the
children arising froni the use of the family car, although the
father would be far distant from the scene of the accident. How-ever it must be remembered that in many of the states chauffeurs
are more common than in Georgia and they will appreciate the
fact that they have propensities, unenslaved and individualistic.
Also that chauffeurs consider their occupation a matter of driving, and not a matter to be driven.
-Thomas V. Happer.
BALIMENTS-Gratutitous Bailee-Conversion.
This is
the case of a gratutious bailee deliverifig certain goods in good
faith and with due care to a man whom he believed to be an express agent. However, the supposed agent of the American
Express Company was later found to be an imposter. He converted the goods in question. The bailor sued the bailee for the
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value of the goods. It was held that in spite of the fact that the
defendant was a gratutious bailee, he was, nevertheless, responsible for the loss of the merchandise. Baer v. Slater, 158 N. E. 328,
Mass. 1927.
It is the first duty of the bailee to take reasonable care of the
bailed chatell. As he receives no benefit, the general rule is that
he is resposible only for gross negligence. What is reasonable
care will depend upon the nature and value of the bailed chatell,
the circumstances of the undertaking and the contract of the
parties. (Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Ray. 909; Foster v. Essex Bank
17 Mass. 479.) It has often been suggested that if the bailee
takes the same care of the bailed goods as of his own he is free
from liability. But one may take risks with his own that he has
no right to take with the property of another. Taking such care
of the bailed goods as of one's own repels a presumption of gross
negligence, but this may be overcome and liabiilty fastened upon
the bailee by showing want of slight negligence. (First National
Bank v. Graham, 79 Pa. St. 106). It seems apparent that the bailor
would not authorize the delivery of the goods to a defrauder and
consequently the act of the bailee was a conversion. (Hall v. Boston
and Worchester R. Co. 14 Akken 439, 433, Mas. 1867.) It is said,
however that if the loss results from conditions equally within
the knowledge of the bailor and bailee then the former cannot
maintain an action against the latter. Thus, if the place where
the goods are to be deposited are known to the bailor, he is
estopped from setting up any loss therefrom. It appears that
the results of the present case are desirable in so far that it takes
no exception to the general rule that regardless of the character
of the bailment, a delivery to an unauthorized third party constitutes negligence and a conversion. It is easy- to see that the
imposing of strict rules of conversion will undoubtly insure
greater safety and protection of the property bailed.
-W. F. Craig.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-Extra Territorial Effect. The doctrine of declaratory judgments is a recent innovation in this country and may increase or decrease in favor in
proportion to the ability of the courts to apply it with satisfactory
results. It has been long established in England, and Scotland
preceded England in its use by several centuries. The Uniform
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Declaratory Judgments Act was approved in the year of 1922 and
the state of Indiana adopted it five years later. The scope of the
act is to afford relief and security with the respect to rights and
status and to have these rights judicially determined.
The foremost objections to the doctrine of declaratory judgments that it is a delegation of non-judicial duties and impairs
the right of due process of law by taking away the right to a trial
by jury. In the case of McCrory Stores Corporation v. Braunstein
(134 Atl. 752) the court held that the act did not violate the provisions in the constitution, that only judicial powers shall be
vested in the courts; but nevertheless the decisions have the effect and the force of judgments.
The question in the instant case to be reviewed is whether a
court of equity by means of a declaratory judgment, may exetcise jurisdiction over real property out of the state Vestchester Mortgage Co. v. Grantl Rqpids & I. R. Co., 246 N. Y. 194, 158 N. E.
71.) The facts indicate that a note had been executed and delivered in the state.of Rh ode Island payable in one year after date,
in the city of Newport:. The security for 'he. said note was tie
assignment of an interest in a trust fund. The trist consisted of
certain real property situated in the state of Rhode Island. At a
time subsequent to this transaction, other assignments of this
interest veer made to secure further indebtedness. The note and
the interest were never paid and the plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment in the "stafe of New'York, on the theory that he had a
lien paramount to all other ofi the property of the trust to the
amount of the note and the interest. The plaintiff was unsuccesful in the prosecution of his action for the reason that the
court of New York claimed that it had no jurisdiction to declare
what rights the plaintiff possessed concerning property in the
state of Rhode Island.
The court of New York correctly adjudicated this case because it is a well settled rule of law that needs no citation that a
court of equity has no power to pass upon the status of property
out of its jurisdiction. A bill of specific performance could not
be maintained in the state of New York to pass title to land in the
state of Rhode Island so why allow the plaintiff to accomplish
something indirectly under the guise of declaratory judgment
that he could not have accomplished directly under regular equity
procedure.
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To permit a court of equity to assume extra territorial effect
over real property would lead to inconceivable abuses and conflicts. The uniform act itself recognizes the distinct jurisdiction
of courts of equity and law. In a recent New Jersey Case (133
Atl. 387) a bill for declaratory relief alleging facts which brought
it within the jurisdiction of the law courts was dismissed because of lack of equity jurisdicton. The Declaratory Judgments
Act does not legalize extra-territorial jurisdiction of the courts,
for it has been long recognized that the rights in property are
rights in rem and the status of them is determined by the state in
which the property is situated. Any other doctrine wbilld be a
gross and reprehensible usurpation. The court of New York
established a correct precedent ii the Westchester case that will
be in all probability followed in other jurisdictions who have
adopted.declaratory judgments.
-Thomas 7. Happer.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-Rights of
Creditors-Chattel Mortgages-Effect of Failure to Record.
The Supreme- Court of Iowa in the case of Raybourn, et al., v.
Creger, et al., 216 N W. 272, was concerned with determining the
rights of creditors of a deceased mortgagor where the chattel
mortgage was not filed uiitil after the death of the'mortgagor.
The effect of the decision of the court is to nullify the efforts of
the decedent to secure a debt due to the children of his deceased
sister for money borrowed from their mother during her lifetime.
The mortgagor employed an attorney to draw up a chattel mortgage on eighty-five head of hogs which were being cared for by
a hired man on mortgagor's farm. After executing the mortgage, he delivered it to the attorney with instructions to file it
for record. He then left the office of the attorney and committed suicide, dying early the next morning. On that same
day, but after the death of the mortgagor, the attorney filed the
mortgage in accordance with the previous instructions. The
-decedent's estate was insolvent and the administrator sold the
hogs described in the mortgage and applied the money to the
payment of general creditors of the estate whose claims had
been filed and-proved against the administrator. Plaintiff then
'commenced this action in equity to establish the lien of his
chattel mortgage on the proceeds of such sale in the hands of
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the administrator. The court held that the equities of the parties
are to be determined as of the time of the death of the deceased
mortgagor, and that, since at that time there was no notice of
record of the chattel mortgage given by decedent, the right of
the creditors to the proceeds of the sale was superior to any
right acquired under such mortgage.
In quoting from Blackman v. Baxter, Reed & Co., 125 Iowa
118, 100 N. W. 75, 70 L. R. A. 250, 2 Ann. Cas. 707, the court
said: "There can be no race between creditors for the assets of
a dead man. After his demise neither the recording of an incumbrance nor the taking of possession can confer a preference.
All rights are of necessity to be adjudicated as of the date of
decedent's death, and, as in an insolvent estate the adminstrator
takes the property for the benefit of the creditors, their interest
in the assets relates back with his title and right of possession."
In quoting further from the same case, the court declared that
"the administrator has taken title and possession, and, regardless
of the date of appointment, that title and possession, according
to the common law . . .relate back to the time of dissolution.
In an insolvent estate that title and possession' is in the trustee
for the benefit of creditors. Their interest in the property attaches the instant of the decedent's death, and, as representing
them, the administrator may insist upon the invalidity of the unrecorded mortgage. The result is equitable, for it avoids clandestine preferences, and distributes the assets of the insolvent
estate among all creditors alike."
The appellant further contended that under the statute there
was no necessity for filing the mortgage for record. The Iowa
statute provides for such filing whenever the mortgaged property
remains in the actual possession of the mortgagor, and appellant
maintained that, since the property was in the possession of the
hired man on a farm on which the mortgagor did not reside, the
recording statute did not apply. This contention, was overruled
by the court on the ground that the person having possession of
the hogs was the mere servant of the mortgagor and his possession was the possession of his master.
Wasted effort is frequently one of the incidents of haste.
Had the decedent been a trifle less hasty in staging his exit from
the manacles of this world, his attorney at least might have had
time to file the chattel mortgage before his untimely death.' Then
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the relatives which he thus sought to save from loss, granting
the validity of the mortgage, might have received the benefit of
the preference which the giving of the mortgage indicates he
wanted them to enjoy.
-Henry Hasley.
GAMING-Measure of wife's recovery for husbands losses
at gambling. This is the case of Worland et al. v. McGill, Court
of appeals of Ohio. (160 N. E. 478.) Lulu E. McGill, plaintiff
brought an action against Thomas C. Worland, Walter Belpash
and the C. E. S. Realty Company as defendants to recover money
she claimed her husband expended at gambling. The lower
court sustained a demurrer to the petition on the grounds that
it did not state a cause of action. Brought to this court on error.
The appeal court was under the opinion that the plaintiff had a
cause of action under Sec. $767, General Code and reversed the
judgment and remanded the cause for further hearing. After
remanding the cause to the court below the action was tried
again and the defendants Worland and Belpash appealed, alleging error.
The court below admitted as evidence of the fact that the
plaintiff's husband had gambled at the defendants gambling
house, an account book in which George H. McGill had kept a
record of his winnings and losses. This book was inadmissible
as the entries were not made contemporaneously or substantially contemporaneously with the transactions. The plaintiff
admitted that she had seen her husband make the entries after
he returned home from the gambling house. The account was
not one kept*in due course of business.
A verdict was given for the plaintiff in the court below in the
sum of $3,500 against all of the defendants. This was assigned
as error. The verdict would have been good against McGill
and Belpash, but not against the C. E. S. Realty Company which
owned the premises in which the gambling resort was kept
There could be no money judgment against the realty company
The court had only power to adjudge the amount of damages,
to be a lien on the premises.
The amount recoverable by the plaintiff in this action would
be the amount expended by plaintiff's husband in gambling and
received by the person or persons conducting the gambling
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scheme, together with exemplary damages as provided by the
code. For reason of the above mentioned errors the judgmeni
is reversed and the cause remanded for a new frial.
-1ohn P. Berstheid.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-Action of tort undet Statute
enabling married women to sue. The plaintiff was injured
through the negligent driving by her husband of an automobile,
the property of the defendant Company being operated in the
conduct of its business by the husband as an agent and employee-of the defendant. . The question is whether an employer
is liable to the wife, where the negligence of the husband and
employee was the cause of her injuries.
The question is a new one in this state but has been presented on many occasions in other jurisdictions. While it is
purely a question of local law, the statutes .in most of the states
are similar in character and have a common object in the removal of the disabilities of married women and the placing of
the sexes with equality respecting their rights and manner of
enforcing them. The particular statute in question allowed
married women to sue and be sued in the same manner as if she
were unmarried and also allowed the wife who was sued jointly
with her husband to separately defend the action.
These statutes in other states have been interpreted by courts in the following jurisdictions: Aultman, Taylor & Co. v. Obermeyer 6 Neb.
210, Strom v. Strom 98 Minn. 427, 107 N. W. 1047, Peters v. Peters
42 Iowa 182, Proser v. Proser 102 S. E. 787, Johnson v. Johnson 77
So. 335. An examination of these authorities disclosed -a great
weight of opinion opposed to opening a field of litigation between
spouses in tort actions by means of judicial interpretation and
without unmistakable legislative action. The procedural difficulties, the dangers of disrupting the secrecy and serenity of
marital relations, the avenue for fraud, the startling innovation
in permitting such controversies, and the lack of clear legislative
indorsement have all been assigned as ample reasons for the refusal of the courts to sanction, by supplying statutory interpretation, a new form of litigation manifestly requiring unequivocal
legislation for its existence. An illustration of this reluctance
is found in Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 111, 21 Ann. Cas. 921,
where the statutes under consideration come close to an author-
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ization. The legislation in most of the states apparently designed to remove disabilities from married women, so as to place
the sexes in an equal position before the law. This was fully attained. The husband may not sue the wife for tort. Both
spouses have the same disability The equality is complete.
The court points out that if the situation is to be changed, it
should come through legislation.
Although the statutes authorizes suits by a wife against
third persons, the question arises whether they may be maintained in cases where they are grounded upon the negligence of
the husband when employed by third persons and the employee
is liable to the employer for his negligence. In the case of
Doremus v. Root, 13 Pac. 572, the court points out that if recovery
may be had by the wife against the employer, and he in turn may
recover from the husband (employee), then the family wealth
remains the same save as diminished by the expenses on the
litigation. It would seem that to permit a recovery against the
employer results simply in countenancing an encircling move-ment wliere a frontal attack upon the husband is inhibited. (Maine
v. James Maine & Sons Co., 201 N. W. (Iowa).
Suits between spouses shold be confined as heretofore to
those having contractual elements or where there is direct statutory authorization, and suits'by a spouse against third persons
grounded upon the tort of .the other spouse, and Without contractual elements, fall ih the same category.
In another recent case Smalley v. Simkins, 215 N. W. (Wis.),
a somewhat analogous situation arose. Mr. and Mrs. Smalley
and Mr. Simkins decided to take a trip to Chicago in Simkins'
car and the men agreed that each should drive half the way.
While Smalley was driving the car came in contact with a telegraph pole and Mrs. Smalley was injured. She brought an action her husband and Simkins. She recovered a judgment in
the lower court and on an appeal by Simkins the Supreme court
of Wisconsin said, "The two Smalleys and Simkins were taking
the trip for separate and distinct purposes of their own. While
driving, Frank Smalley was as much the agent of the plaintiff
as he was that of Simkins. The plaintiff ought not therefore
to be permitted to assert an alleged agency of her husband, the
'driver, for the owner of the car, and ignore an exactly similar
-relationship existing at the same time between her husband and
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herself. In substance, Simkins was loaning the use of his car to.
the Smalleys, and the two supplied their own driver at that
portion of the journey. While this decision is based upon a
somewhat different grounds than those cited heretofore it nevertheless shows the reluctance of courts to offer aid to a wife in
a tort action. These cases represent the apparent weight of
authority in the United States. If a wife is to be permitted to
her husband in a tort action, and I see no immediate need for
such relief under ordinary circumstances, her relief must come
about through positive legislation and not judicial interpretation.
-Edward P. McGuire.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Injunction for NuisanceMulct Tax. In State ex rel Seeburger Co. Atty. v. De Leon et al
the court granted an injunction against the property of all the
defendants and assessed a mulct tax of $600 against all the defendants and the property for the maintainence of a liquor nuisance. The defendant De Leon was the lessee of the property
and it was owned by Tolchinsky and Friedman. These two defendants appealed from the injunction and the mulct tax on the
grounds that they did not know, and had no reason to believe,
that their tenant was maintaining a liquor nuisance.
The court here held that when a decree of injunction is
granted against the tenant an injunction shall be granted asagainst the property, regardless of whether of not the owner
had knowledge of the nuisance. State, ex rel Seeburger v. Pickett,
202 Iowa 1321, 210 N. W. 782. As the state did not conclusively
show that appellants had knowledge of the nuisance it was improper to assess the mulct tax against them. Seeburger v. Pickett
supra, Drake v. Kingsbaker, 72 Iowa 441, 34 N. W. 199. Reversed
as to mulct tax.
-Marc Wonderlin.
MASTER AND SERVANT-Workmen's Compensation
Act-Injury by Nail Thrown by Fellow Servant in Play Before
Beginning Work. Workmen's Compensation Acts during recent years have found a place on the statute books of a great
many of our states. Their uniform aim is to provide relief for
the workman injured in the course of his employment and to
make the business in which he is engaged carry the burden of
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the casualties and .1tjiries caused by it. The extent to which
•such acts have been invoked in the fulfillment of their humane
mission is well illustrated *by the case of Badger Furniture Co. et
al. v. Champeat,.Vi al, 217 N. W.734. (i9.8), decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
The original action in the District Court was brought to
review an award of the Industrial Commission in favor of Chainpeau under the Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act.
Champeau was an employee of the furriiture company and was'
hired to run a spinning machine. Tie basis of his claim for
compensation was an inquiry to his eye caused by a nail which
was playfully thrown by a fellow employee. The injury occured about seven minutes before time to begin work, while
Champeau was sitting on a window sill five feet from his machine, awaiting the signal to start the machine. His fellow employee was seated on another window sill a short distance away
when he negligently threw the nail in play, striking claimant
in the eye. Under this set of facts, the District Court set aside
the award of the Industrial Commission. Claimant appealed to
the Supreme Court of the state.
The Wisconsin act, among other things, contained this provision for liability: "-Where at the time of the accident, the
employee is performing service growing out of and incidental
to his'employmetit. Every employee going to and from his employment in the ordinary and usual way, while on the premises
of his employer, shall be deemed to be performing service growing out of and incidental to his employment." The statute,therefore, is very broad in its provision as to what constitutes
"service growing out of an incidental to his employment". And
since negligence of the fellow servant is no defense, the injury
to Champeau clearly grew out of his employment, within the
meaning of the act. .The fact that the nail was thrown in play
can make no difference, since the injured employee was not en"gaged in play at the"time of the injury.
But that is not all. The court even goes so far as to overrule the former decision of the same tribunal in the case of
Federal Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Havolic, r62 Wis. 341, 156 N. If.
143, L. R. A. 1916D, 968, in which compensation was denied. The
court said: "In that case the injured workman had ceased
work at night, and, before leaving the premises, was dusting his
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clothes with a compressed air hose. A fellow employee voluntarily undertook to clean the dust from the injured workman's
back with the hose, and in using the hose to play a practical
joke he unintentionally injured the workman. .

.

. When the

Havolic Case was decided, the court had not had many cases
under the Compensation Act before it, and there were but few
decisions under Compensation Acts in other jurisdictions. Since
then the law of workmen's compensation has been more fully
developed, and there has been a general trend of liberality in
interpreting the act in this court to carry out the legislative purpose .... We are satisfied that this court was in error in its de-

cision in the Havolic Case. That case, therefore, must be, and
it is, overruled."
In the instant case, the decision of the District Court was
reversed and the award of the Industrial- Commission sustained.
-Henry Hasley.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Building Permit Not A
Contract-Right to Revoke. 'In a suit for damages (Rehmann et
al v .City of Des Moines 215 N. W. 957,) sustained by the plaintiff
when he failed to perform a contract for the sale of a building,
such failure being caused by the city's wrongful revocation of
his building permit. The plaintiff' contended that the officers
of the city wrongfully revoked the permit, -that the defendant
city is liable for the ratification of the wrongful revocation and
that the defendant city breached its contract and is liable thereon.
A public officer in the exercise of his judicial or quasi judicial duties is not liable in damages for the honest exercise of his
judgment within his jurisdiction according to Roerig v. Houghton
144 Minnesota 231, 175 N. W. 542. The revocation of a building
permit is the exercise of the police power and the city is not liable in damages to the owner. Stevens v. City of Muskegon 111
Michigan 72, 61 N. W. 227. -A permit is the privlege to; do
what would otherwise be unlawful and is not a contract. Therefore the city cannot be held for the breach of contract. 37 C. J.
168; Lerch v. City of Duluth, 88 Minnesota 295, 92, N. W. 1116.
-- Marc Wonderlin.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-City Not Liable for
Damages Arising Out of Revocation of Building Permit. The
original action was brought in the court of common, pleas to re-
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cover damages against the city of Toledo for revoking a building
permit in contemplation of the construction of a street after the
plaintiff had expended large sums of money for excavation,
drainage and other work looking towards the construction of the
dwelling house authorized by the permit. The court sustained
a general demurrer to the petition and, as the plaintiff did not
desire to plead further, her petition was dismissed. James v. City
of Toledo, 157 N. E. 309 (Ohio).
The petition stated that the plaintiff was the owner of lot
number 56 in Lewis Heights in the City of Toledo and had entered into a written contract with one Ruch for the construction
of a house on said lot, and for this purpose secured from the defendant, through its commissioner, a permit authorizing the construction of said house. After the plaintiff had purchased
material and started the construction work, the city council
passed a resolution appropriating certain property, including the
plaintiff's lot, for the purpose of constructing a street. The commissioner then withdrew the building permit and ordered all
construction work to be stopped. The plaintiff alleges that she
requested the defendant to either buy or appropriate her property
or reissue her permit but said requests were refused and subsequently another resolution was passed by the city council
which nullified the previous resolution whereby her property had
been appropriated. That she has suffered great damages by
having the permit revoked and by the failure on the part of the
defendant to appropriate her lot.
Citing the case of Clinard v. City of Winston-Salem 91 S. E.
1039, the court held that the matter of issuing and revoking of
building permits was clearly a case of a municipality acting in
a governmental capacity and for which the city cannot be held
for damages. In thus acting the city was a representative of
the state and non-liability could arise for such acts. The court
added, however, that notwithstanding the non-liability of the
city for damages, an action of mandamus to compel the issuing
of a building permit would lie in a proper case.
-Herbert J. Nester.
NEGLIGENCE-Plaintiff required to show dangerous nature of dye which caused injury. Pauline Karr was plaintiff in
the case of Karr v. Inecto Inc. Court of Appeals of New York.
160 N.E.398. The defendant was a manufacturer of hair dye.
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The plaintiff conducted a "beauty parlor", and was requested by
a patron to apply the dye manufactured by the defendant to the
hair of the patron. This was done and during the operation the
plaintiff claims some of the liquid came in contact with her finger
and as a result the finger began to swell. 'An infection set in,
which necessitated several operations on plaintiff's finger. The
plaintiff claims that she had never before applied the dye, herself, but it had been used br some of her employees. She also
claims she used care so as not to come in contact with the dye.
It is alleged that the dye is of an inherently dangerous nature
and poisonous to the skin.
To recover damages the plaintiff must show that the dye was
the cause of her injury; that the dye or chemical was inherently
dangerous or poisonous and that the defendant was negligent
in putting a dangerous and harmful product on the market. The
appellate division reversed a "decision dismissing the action, holding that the evidence did not make out a prima facie case.
This court is of the opinion that the action should be dismissed for the reason stated above. The plaintiff has failed to
show that the dye was inherently dangerous or that the injury
was the result of coming in contact with the dye. It was not
shown that the dye had injured the person to whom the dye had
been applied as a means of coloring the hair. The dye was in
that case applied to the scalp and some of it trickeled down the
customers forehead. It seems then that the plaintiff's injury was
probably due not to the harmful effect alleged to the dye, but
to some other infection. The plaintiff's contention is too conjectural to merit any consideration. The evidence does not
support the claim. Judgment of the trial court affirmed.
-John P. Berscheid.

AN ANNOUNCEMENT
The faculty of the College of Law has recently announced
its appointment of Thomas V. Happer of Dayton, Ohio as editorin-chief of the "Notre Dame Lawyer" to succeed Joseph P.
McNamara, the retiring editor. Mr. Happer has been prominent on the staff of the review this year. Russell C. Kuehl of
South Bend, present assistant business manager, has been appointed to succeed Robert J. Mohlmann as business manager.
Mr. Kuehl has been on the business staff for two years.

